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In recent years, an increasing number of scholars and
commentators have turned their attention to the criminalization of
migration in the United States.1 These scholars have focused on three
distinct trends: the increasingly harsh criminal consequences attached
to violations of laws regulating migration,2 the use of removal as an
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1. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions,
Crime Control and National Security, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1827, 1827–32 (2007) [hereinafter
Chacón, Unsecured Borders] (outlining “origins and consequences of the blurred
boundaries between immigration control, crime control, and national security”); Daniel
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September
11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 639, 640 (2004) [hereinafter
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented] (considering “convergence between the
immigration and criminal justice systems”); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 469, 471–72 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation]
(describing “growing convergence” of criminal justice and immigration control systems);
Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After
September 11th, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 83–86 (2005) (describing consequences of
interaction between criminal justice and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship &
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 611,
616–20 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship & Severity] (describing criminalization of
immigration law); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367, 376–77 (2006) [hereinafter Stumpf,
Crimmigration Crisis] (noting “intense interest” in “crimmigration law”).
2. See, e.g., Chacón, Unsecured Borders, supra note 1, at 1844 (noting 1996
immigration laws “impos[ed] a system of tough penalties that favor removal even in cases
involving relatively minor infractions or very old crimes”); Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented, supra note 1, at 640 (noting post-9/11 push to criminalize “unlawful
presence in the United States”); Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, at
476–82 (describing expansion of immigration-related criminal offenses); Miller,
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adjunct to criminal punishment in cases involving noncitizens,3 and the
rising reliance on criminal law enforcement actors and mechanisms in
civil immigration proceedings.4 One major effect of these three trends
has been the incorporation of criminal law methodologies into the realm
of civil immigration enforcement and adjudication. Recently, Stephen
Legomsky has theorized the asymmetric nature of this incorporation.5
As he explains, the “theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities” of
criminal law enforcement have been incorporated into immigration
proceedings, while the procedural protections of criminal adjudication
have been explicitly rejected.6 His analysis focuses on how the
criminalization of migration is reshaping the realm of civil immigration
proceedings.
In contrast, this Essay centralizes and attempts to theorize the
criminal prosecutions of migration-related offenses.7 Part I of this Essay
describes this trend. Specifically, Part I.A highlights the ways in which
the regulation of migration has increasingly become a subject of the
criminal law. Part I.B discusses the explosion of migration-related
criminal prosecutions over the past few years.
Part II of this Essay provides several examples of the use of criminal
prosecutions in the migration context in order to explore an
Citizenship & Severity, supra note 1, at 617 (describing “stiff criminal penalties” for
immigration violations); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and
Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557, 1589–92 (2008) [hereinafter
Stumpf, States of Confusion] (describing imposition of criminal penalties for violations of
immigration-related laws).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the
Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member”, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 317, 321–24
[hereinafter Chacón, Whose Community Shield?] (describing use of revised immigration
laws and removal proceedings to disrupt gangs); Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented, supra note 1, at 653 (“After the criminal justice system has completed its
work, the removal system begins.”); Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1,
at 482–86 (describing “proliferation of new crime-related deportation grounds”); Miller,
Citizenship & Severity, supra note 1, at 614 (“[C]riminal grounds for deporting noncitizens that were previously quite limited and enforced with laxity have been greatly
expanded in scope and are now strictly enforced through a variety of mechanisms and
institutional arrangements that have produced unprecedented cooperation between
criminal and immigration law enforcement.”).
4. See, e.g., Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 3, at 339–43 (describing
participation of criminal enforcement officers in immigration proceedings); Anil Kalhan,
The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement,
41 U.C. Davis L. Rev 1137, 1161–63 (2008) (describing increased role of state and local
officials in enforcement of immigration laws); Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation,
supra note 1, at 489–500 (describing importation of criminal law enforcement strategies
to immigration law); Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1595 (“Several postSeptember 11, 2001 federal actions have had the effect of drawing state and local police
into indirectly enforcing immigration law.”); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1084–88 (2004) (discussing
entry of civil immigration violations into NCIC database).
5. See generally Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1.
6. Id. at 472.
7. Legomsky discusses these prosecutions, but they are not central to his analysis. Id.
at 481.
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undertheorized effect of this trend, namely, that the protective features
of criminal investigation and adjudication are melting away at the edges
in certain criminal cases involving migration-related offenses. Part II.A
explores the border-centered prosecutions of Operation Streamline and
the more geographically diffuse Fast Track program aimed at felony
reentries. Part II.B focuses upon the use of criminal prosecutions in
worksite immigration enforcement efforts. Part II.C diagnoses the ways
in which these proceedings reflect declining procedural protections in
the realm of criminal prosecutions for immigration-related offenses.
As these examples make clear, not only are we seeing what Stephen
Legomsky has termed the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice
norms into civil removal proceedings, but we are also witnessing the
importation of the relaxed procedural norms of civil immigration
proceedings into the criminal realm.
I. REGULATING MIGRATION THROUGH CRIME
The regulation of migration has long taken place primarily in the
civil sphere.8 In recent years, however, the U.S. government has
increasingly handled migration control through the criminal justice
system. Part I.A discusses the legislation that Congress and various state
legislatures have enacted to criminalize acts associated with migration.
Part I.B. describes the recent upward spike in prosecutions of these
migration-related offenses.
A. Creating and Enhancing Criminal Sanctions for Offenses Relating to
Migration
Since the 1980s, Congress has passed legislation subjecting more
and more acts associated with migration to criminal penalties, or
increasing the severity of criminal sanctions imposed for the commission
of those acts.9 Criminal offenses newly created in the 1980s included the
hiring of unauthorized noncitizen workers,10 reliance on false
documents to evade employer sanctions laws,11 and marriage fraud.12 In
the late 1980s and the 1990s, illegal reentry provisions were added and

8. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 1899–913
(2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Hard Laws] (discussing early history of migration
regulation).
9. See sources cited supra note 2; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside
the Law, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 2037, 2087–88 (2008) (“Criminalization has been the trend
since the 1990s, when Congress increased penalties for existing immigration-related
crimes, such as smuggling and various types of document fraud, and added several new
immigration-related crimes.”).
10. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
11. IRCA § 103(a).
12. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 § 2(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)
(2006).
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strengthened,13 as were various fraud provisions relating to the processes
of seeking immigration benefits and citizenship.14 And in 2000,
penalties were raised for various offenses relating to trafficking in
persons.15
Although the criminalization of migration-related offenses used to
be entirely federal in nature, in recent years, states and localities have
added a host of anti-loitering laws and other similar ordinances that are
clearly intended to—and have been used to—facilitate the criminal
prosecution of unauthorized migrants at the state and local level.16 One
example is Arizona’s version of the identity theft law. The crime—
entitled “Taking identity of another person or entity”—creates criminal
culpability for the use of an alternate identity whether or not the
defendant knows that he is using the identity of an actual person and
whether or not another person with such an identity actually exists.17
This offense, which does not require theft of an actual identity, can be
deployed as a means of prosecuting noncitizens who have used false
identities to obtain employment in cases where there is no loss to anyone
as a result of the use of that identity. Several other states have also

13. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7345, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) (increasing
criminal sentences for unlawful reentry); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130001(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2006)) (criminalizing reentry after commission of three or more
enumerated misdemeanors).
14. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C. §§ 213–215, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)
(2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 1015(e)–(f) (2006)).
15. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S.
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2977, 2992–93 (2006)
[hereinafter Chacón, Misery and Myopia] (discussing criminal provisions added or
enhanced by Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000).
16. See Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, at 496–98 (discussing
IIRIRA encouragement of “use of state and local criminal enforcement machinery to
bolster the INS civil immigration enforcement efforts”); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome
to Hazelton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the
Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 6–13 (2007) (discussing
municipal legislation in Hazelton, PA, Altoona, PA, and San Bernardino, CA); Michael A.
Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the
Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 31–33 (“[F]rom January through
June, 2006, almost 500 immigration-related bills had been introduced in state legislatures,
and 44 had been enacted, in 19 states.”); Christina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the
Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 581–90 (2008) (discussing
examples in Illinois, North Carolina, and Iowa); Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note
2, at 1596–600 (discussing examples of local criminal enforcement in North Carolina,
Illinois, Oklahoma, California, Wyoming, New York, and Pennsylvania); Rick Su, A
Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1619, 1642–49 (2008)
(using Town of Hazelton in Eastern Pennsylvania to discuss theory of indirect regulation
at local level).
17. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2008 (Supp. 2008) (criminalizing “Taking identity
of another person or entity; knowingly accepting identity of another person;
classification”); § 13-2009 (criminalizing “Aggravated taking identity of another person or
entity; classification”); § 13-2010 (criminalizing “Trafficking in the identity of another
person or entity; classification”).
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enacted provisions that mirror federal prohibitions on immigration
crimes like smuggling and harboring of unauthorized migrants and false
proof of citizenship or immigration status.18 These statutes take
advantage of federally created immigration categories to create a space
for local enforcement.19
B. Increasing Prosecutions for Immigration Offenses
Related to, but even more striking than the steady increase in
migration-related criminal offenses is the rising tidal wave of
immigration-related criminal prosecutions of the past decade. After
remaining relatively flat in the period from 1986 to 1996, the number of
immigration prosecutions almost quadrupled over the next ten years.20
The prosecution of migration-related offenses exploded in the wake of
September 11, 2001. In 2004, U.S. magistrates convicted 15,662
noncitizens of immigration crimes, and U.S. district court judges
The numbers continued to climb
convicted another 15,546.21
thereafter.22 Since 2004, immigration prosecutions have topped the list
of federal criminal prosecutions, outstripping federal drug and weapons
prosecutions, and dwarfing many other forms of federal criminal
prosecutions.23 This trend has continued even with the change in
presidential administrations.24 And, as previously noted, states and
localities—long thought to be excluded from the enforcement of
18. See Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 2, at 1599 n.224 (citing examples
from Oklahoma, Tennessee, California, Oregon, and Wyoming). An expanding number
of states and localities have also targeted employers and landlords who hire or enter into
contracts with unauthorized migrants. See id. (discussing ordinances in Escondido,
California, Suffolk County, New York, and Hazleton, Pennsylvania); see also McKanders,
supra note 16, at 6–13 (discussing ordinances in Hazelton, PA, Altoona, PA, and San
Bernardino, CA).
19. See Su, supra note 16, at 1642 (describing trend as “indirect regulations of
immigration”).
20. TRAC, Graphical Highlights: DHS Criminal Enforcement Trends (2005), at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhstrendsG.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
21. TRAC, Graphical Highlights:
Offenses Differ by Court (2005), at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsoffcourtG.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). The vast majority of these prosecutions are for illegal entry and illegal
reentry. Id.
22. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Prosecutions Hit New High, Wash. Post, June 2,
2008, at A1.
23. TRAC, New Findings:
Department of Homeland Security (2005), at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“[I]mmigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal
prosecutions, about one third (32%) of the total. By comparison, narcotics and drugs, for
many years the government’s dominant enforcement interest, dropped to about a quarter
of the total (27%) and weapons matters to slightly less than one out of ten (9%).”).
24. TRAC, ICE Criminal Prosecutions Continue to Rise Under Obama (2009), at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/216/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“[A]t least through the first five months of the Obama Administration there has been no
let up in the increase in criminal prosecutions as a result of ICE’s enforcement
activities.”).
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immigration law—have found ways to use their own criminal laws to
supplement these federal prosecutions.
These trends have attracted the notice of immigration scholars,25
but have not received much concerted attention from criminal law
scholars. Indeed, the restoration of some semblance of rationality to the
discourse on the war on crime has perhaps drawn attention away from
the parallel trend whereby the tools formerly used to fight the war on
crime are increasingly put to use against noncitizens.26 The lack of
attention to the unprecedented criminalization of migration by scholars
of criminal law and procedure is unfortunate because, like the war on
drugs that preceded it,27 the emerging use of the criminal justice system
to attack the social problem of unauthorized migration carries with it
distinct procedural and social consequences that are worthy of sustained
attention. In the next Part, I provide a few examples to illustrate this
point.

II. DECLINING PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL SPHERE
The well-known constitutional maxim that deportation (now
28
“removal”) is not punishment provides longstanding precedent for
25. See, e.g., Chacón, Unsecured Borders, supra note 1, at 1847 (describing “new
enforcement actions that . . . feed and fuel the notion of dangerous classes of aliens”);
Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1, at 479 (noting escalation of
immigration-related criminal prosecutions beginning in 1980s); see also Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 1, at 388 (“For the first time, immigration prosecutions
outnumber all other types of federal criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for
drugs and weapons violations.”); Abby Sullivan, Note, On Thin ICE: Cracking Down on
the Racial Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a Compassionate Enforcement
Policy, 6 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 101, 117 (2009) (providing statistics showing
“notable leap” in immigrants serving federal prison terms).
26. For examples of literature that examine the former phenomenon, see After the
War on Crime 2 (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian Haney López & Jonathan Simon eds. 2008).
27. For discussion of the procedural and social consequences of the war on drugs,
see, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 753, 754–57 (2002) (discussing
procedural consequences of war on drugs); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 340–42 (1998) (addressing social impact of procedural
changes); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the War on Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137,
2160 (2002) (noting war on crime transformed criminal procedure and hypothesizing
that war on terror will do same); Loïc Wacquant, The Place of the Prison in the New
Government of Poverty, in After the War on Crime, supra note 26, at 27 (discussing social
consequences of mass incarceration).
28. Until 1996, immigration proceedings to prevent noncitizens from entering the
country were termed “exclusion” proceedings, while proceedings to remove a noncitizen
that had already entered the country were termed “deportation” proceedings. See
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 420–21 (5th ed. 2009).
IIRIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation, and labeled the resulting proceedings
“removal” proceedings. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–
597 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. §
1015(e)–(f) (2006)) §§ 304, 308. Now, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) indicates that the removal
proceedings defined in that section are for determining “whether an alien may be
admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the
United States.”
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important legal distinctions between civil immigration proceedings and
29
criminal proceedings.
Noncitizens in removal proceedings are not
30
entitled to counsel at the government’s expense. Evidence obtained in
violation of a noncitizen’s constitutional rights generally is not subject to
31
suppression in civil removal proceedings.
And immigration
detention—which is also not legal “punishment”—is not subject to the
32
same constitutional constraints as criminal detention.
These
distinctions have frequently caused immigration attorneys to yearn for
33
the constitutional protections of criminal proceedings, even while
acknowledging the inadequacies of those protections.
Unfortunately, recent developments suggest that the lower
standards of procedural protections that apply in removal proceedings
have made ultra vires incursions into the criminal realm. For purposes
of this Essay, a few examples suffice to illustrate the problem. Part II.A
outlines two programs aimed at addressing the crimes of entry without
inspection and felony reentry. Part II.B discusses prosecutions arising
out of a worksite raid. Part II.C addresses the declining procedural
protections in the realm of criminal prosecutions for migration-related
offenses.34
29. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (distinguishing hard
labor, which is punishment, from deportation, which is not); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (suggesting congressional power with regard to
deportation is virtually limitless); see also Kanstroom, Hard Laws, supra note 8, at 1895
(discussing and contesting maxim).
30. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
31. See id. at 1050 (holding exclusionary rule generally does not apply in
deportation proceedings, but could apply if constitutional violations were “egregious”).
The Court also discussed the possibility of applying the exclusionary rule in removal
proceedings if violations became “widespread.” Id. For arguments that this threshold has
been reached, see Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting LopezMendoza, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 1109, 1109 (arguing that “constitutional violations by
immigration officers have become . . . geographically and institutionally widespread in the
years since Lopez-Mendoza”); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of
Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1114 (2004) (noting that “[u]nder the logic
of Lopez-Mendoza itself, the exclusionary rule may now be appropriate in immigration
proceedings” given widespread evidence of racial profiling in immigration enforcement).
32. Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in
Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 149, 150 (2004) (discussing uses of immigration
detention since September 11, 2001 to circumvent constitutional limitations on
detention).
33. See, e.g., Burch Elias, supra note 31, at 1114 (arguing for adoption of
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings); Wishnie, supra note 31, at 1114 (same).
34. Not discussed here, but also relevant, is the development of case law concluding
that certain undocumented migrants in the United States—such as felony reentrants—are
not entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment at all. See, e.g., United States v.
Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1273–74 (D. Utah 2003) (denying motion for
suppression of evidence under Fourth Amendment due to alien defendant’s “lack of
substantial sufficient connection” to United States); see also M. Isabel Medina, Exploring
the Use of the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 Ind. L.J. 1557
(2008) (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that incorrectly suggests right is
limited to citizens).
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A. Criminal Prosecutions for Unlawful Entries
Because there are hundreds of thousands of unauthorized border
crossings each year,35 prosecuting every misdemeanor unlawful border
crossing would require a prohibitive outlay of additional governmental
resources. Nevertheless, in recent years the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has made an effort to significantly increase the number of immigration
prosecutions.36
Consequently, the number of such prosecutions
ballooned—from just over 18,000 in 2001 to over 35,000 in 2007.37
1.
Operation Streamline. — A significant portion of these
prosecutions have taken place under the auspices of Operation
Streamline.38 Under the Operation Streamline program, all unlawful
entrants interdicted by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in a
designated sector of the border region are criminally prosecuted.39 In
Tucson, Arizona, for example, about fifty to one hundred defendants are
prosecuted for illegal entry every single day.40 The picture is similar in
35. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Trends in Unauthorized
Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow, at i (2008), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=94 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[I]nflows of unauthorized immigrants averaged 800,000 a year from 2000 to
2004, but fell to 500,000 a year from 2005 to 2008 with a decreasing year-to-year trend”).
36. John Grasty Crews, II, The Executive Office for United States Attorneys’
Involvement in Immigration Law Enforcement, U.S. Attorney’s Bull., Nov. 2008, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5606.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing “increase[d] misdemeanor prosecutions along
the southwest border”).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Operation Streamline Nets
1,200-Plus
Prosecutions
in
Arizona
(June
24,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2007_news_releases/0
72007/07242007_3.xml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 1,200 of 2,800
immigration prosecutions in Yuma sector of Arizona took place under auspices of
Operation Streamline).
39. The designated sector is not fixed, but changes over time, and usually covers a
fifteen to twenty mile stretch of the border region. The notion is that all entrants in that
sector will be prosecuted, but because available criminal detention facilities (and the
courts) are not designed to accommodate such a mass of pretrial inmates, apprehended
individuals who pose particular challenges (such as women and individuals who speak
languages other than Spanish) are often released without being prosecuted. Telephone
Interview with Jon Sands, Fed. Pub. Defender, Dist. of Ariz. (Oct. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
Sands Interview] (notes on file with the Columbia Law Review).
40. Id.; see also United States v. Roblero-Solis, No. 08-10396, 2009 WL 4282022, at *1
(9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2009) (describing one particular mass plea agreement and noting that
“in twelve months’ time the court has handled 25,000” of these pleas); Brief of DefendantAppellants at 6, United States v. Roblero-Solis, Nos. 08-10396, 08-10397, 08-10466, 0810509, 08-10512, 08-10543 (consolidated) (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2009) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Roblero-Solis Brief] (describing Streamline plea
proceeding); Oversight Hearing on the Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
Before the H.R. S. Comm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2008) (Statement of Heather E. Williams, Federal Public
Defender,
District
of
Arizona),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Williams080625.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Williams Testimony] (tracking prosecution caseloads after

2009]

MANAGING MIGRATION THROUGH CRIME

143

other jurisdictions where Streamline has been implemented.41 During
these proceedings, defense counsel represents anywhere from six to
eight defendants to as many as thirty or forty defendants.42 Defense
counsel typically converses briefly with each defendant to establish
whether they might have any defenses (such as citizenship, authorization
to enter, or claims of entering pursuant to a lawful inspection), but if no
such issue is raised, counsel generally participates in the entry of mass
pleas on behalf of his or her multiple clients.43
2. “Fast Track” Proceedings. — Illegal entry cases are not the only
cases fueling the upward spiral in immigration-related prosecution.
Previously removed individuals who are apprehended after returning to
the United States can be charged with felony reentry—a crime that now
carries a sentence of up to twenty years if the prior removal was a result
of conviction for an aggravated felony.44 Felony reentry prosecutions
and convictions are already rapidly on the rise throughout the United
States.45 In districts that demonstrate to the DOJ that they have “an
exceptionally large number” of illegal reentry cases that will
“significantly strain[]” prosecutorial resources, the DOJ can authorize
prosecutors to offer “Fast Track” sentences in illegal reentry cases that
are significantly below the federal guidelines.46 As in the Streamline
context, the relatively light sentences generate ready pleas from the vast
majority of those apprehended and charged with felony reentry.
B. Postville: Aggravated Identity Theft Pleas
The routinized mass plea agreements that characterize border
justice are not limited to the southern border. Attorneys from ICE and
CBP who have been cross-designated as “Special Assistant United States
implementation of Operation Streamline); David Bacon, Railroading Immigrants, The
Nation, Oct. 6, 2008, at 20 (same).
41. See Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 5–7 (discussing developments in Del
Rio, TX, Laredo, TX, and Yuma, AZ); see also David McLemore, Border Patrol Gets
Tough in Laredo, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/mexico/stories/110207dnt
exlaredo.3584a01.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing twenty-seven
defendants in South Texas Streamline prosecution “lined up three deep” and entering
plea in unison after brief discussion with federal defender).
42. Sands Interview, supra note 39.
43. Id.; see also Roblero-Solis, 2009 WL 4282022, at *2 (describing one such mass plea
agreement); Roblero-Solis Brief, supra note 40, at 10–14 (describing mass plea system).
Sentencing also takes place en masse, in smaller groups of fifteen or twenty. Id. at 15.
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
45. See,
e.g.,
TRAC,
Immigration
Convictions
for
July
2009,
at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjul09/gui/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting convictions under § 1326
comprise about ten percent of convictions by magistrate judges for immigration
violations).
46. See Alison Seigler, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 Fed.
Sent’g Rep. 299, 299, 303 (2009) (noting DOJ arguments in favor of Fast-Track program).
One result of the program is massive sentencing disparities between Fast-Track and nonFast-Track jurisdictions. Id at 299.
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Attorneys” (SAUSAs) have been assigned to the southern border regions
to assist with illegal entry and felony reentry prosecutions, but they have
also been dispatched to assist in criminal prosecutions at the sites of
interior workplace raids47 like the one that took place at the
Agriprocessors plant in Postville, Iowa on May 12, 2008.48
Of the approximately 1,000 workers in the Postville plant, ICE
officers arrested about 390 workers on the day of the raids.49 A number
of these arrestees were released for humanitarian reasons, but the rest—
just over 300 people—were detained for prosecution.50 Over the course
of the next few days, 297 of them pled guilty to aggravated identity theft
based on their use of false documents to obtain employment.51
In reality, many of those who pled guilty to aggravated identity theft
probably did not satisfy the mens rea requirement of the charge because
they had no knowledge that they were taking the identity of an existing
person. The legal soundness of charging identity theft in cases where
there is no evidence of such knowledge was in doubt even at the time of
the Postville raids, and less than two years after these events, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts that had required such
knowledge as an element of the federal identity theft provision.52
As with the border prosecutions, however, the government
proceeded on the theory—in hindsight, a seemingly erroneous one—
that few of the arrestees would have valid legal defenses to the charges.
Yet the combined threat of lengthy pretrial detention, coupled with the
threat of a two-year prison sentence, prompted almost all of the arrestees
to plead guilty in exchange for a five-month sentence.53 The defendants
who pled guilty were also ordered removed by the same judge even
though the provisions of immigration law allowing for such judicial
orders of removal did not actually apply in these cases.54 The Postville
47. Crews, II, supra note 36, at 3.
48. Nigel Duara, William Petrosky & Grant Schulte, Claims of ID Fraud Lead to
Largest Raid in State History, Des Moines Reg., May 12, 2008, available at
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080512/NEWS/80512
012/1001 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
49. Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting After the Largest ICE Raid in US History: A
Personal Account, 7 J. Latino Stud. 123, 125 (2009). Warrants existed for an additional
300 workers who were not present at the time of the raid and were not arrested. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Julia Preston, 270 Illegal Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 2008, at A1 (“The unusually swift proceedings, in which 297 immigrants
pleaded guilty and were sentenced in four days, were criticized by criminal defense
lawyers, who warned of violations of due process.”).
52. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888 (2009) (holding
aggravated identity theft statute requires showing that defendant knew identification used
belonged to another person).
53. Camayd-Freixas, supra note 49, at 5. But cf. Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes:
The Postville Raids and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 U. Seattle L.
Rev. 651, 673–74 (2009) (taking issue with Camayd-Freixas’s conclusion that pleas were
“coerced,” noting that this was not true in strict legal sense, although pleas “were the
product of a subtle systemic coercion”).
54. Moyers, supra note 53, at 688 (noting entire plea arrangement relied upon
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prosecutions are the clearest example to date of the ways in which mass
plea agreements can be deployed in immigration-related prosecutions
even outside of the border context.
C. Diagnosing the Harms
Arguably, the mass plea agreements used as a means of migration
control can do little harm since many defendants probably have no good
legal defenses to the charges, particularly in cases involving entry without
inspection or felony reentry. Moreover, most defendants who have valid
defenses such as derivative citizenship or an invalid prior removal order
will presumably be identified by the defenders who meet briefly with the
client prior to entry of the plea.55 Nevertheless, even if these
assumptions are true, these mass plea proceedings have a corrosive effect
on the administration of justice. I address three specific problems here,
but there are many others.56
First, this approach ensures that abuses that take place at the stage
of investigation and detention are not addressed by the courts. For
example, with regard to Operation Streamline, it may be fair to assume
that many of the arrests made by CBP officials comport with CBP’s
internal regulations and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
but that is certainly not always the case.57 Yet, when allegations of
misconduct surface in the context of Streamline’s mass plea agreements,
the affected migrant is generally released and charges dropped—
otherwise, the government has to take a border patrol officer off the line
to testify.58 With thousands of potential defendants crossing the border
each day, it is simply easier to drop charges against one migrant than
defend against allegations of constitutional violations.59 From a resource
perspective, this makes perfect sense. The problem is that it removes any
misinterpretations of federal identity theft provision and relevant removal provisions); see
also Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & Sarah J. Diaz, Re-Interpreting Postville: A Legal
Perspective, 2 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 31, 64 (2008) (arguing reliance on judicial removal
provision of immigration law was inappropriate in these cases).
55. The amount of time spent by an attorney with a particular client varies. In
Arizona, public defenders typically represent six or seven defendants at each Streamline
hearing and are able to spend around fifteen minutes talking to each client before a plea
is entered. Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 4; Sands Interview, supra note 39.
Resources are stretched more thinly in places like the Southern District of Texas, where
there are fewer panel lawyers to represent Streamline defendants, and defense counsel
can represent as many as thirty to forty defendants in a proceeding. See Sands Interview,
supra note 39; see also McLemore, supra note 41 (“27 people were brought before U.S.
Magistrate Adriana Arce-Flores to enter a plea for misdemeanor illegal entry. A federal
public defender visited briefly with each one as they lined up three deep . . . .”).
56. See Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 10–16 (listing numerous administrative
costs, health risks and potential constitutional violations resulting from Streamline
system).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Portillo, No. 08-40803, 2009 WL 3429563, at *5
(5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009) (holding CBP lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car
and therefore conducted illegal search).
58. Sands Interview, supra note 39.
59. Id.
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possibility of deterrence through suppression in the course of criminal
proceedings. Rogue agents have a much greater chance of nondetection in this system, particularly because there is almost no chance
of an impoverished migrant bringing—much less winning—a civil suit
from outside of the country after removal.
Second, the proceedings engage the justice system in a process that
is, at best, tremendously dehumanizing. Individuals picked up along the
border, many of them who have been in the elements for some time, are
brought in shackles en masse to a courthouse after a period of detention
(usually overnight), often in the same clothes they wore over the course
of their journey.60 Their only individualized contact in a foreign
criminal justice system is a very brief conversation with a public
defender. These prosecutions have already changed the face of federal
prisons. As a result of aggressive immigration prosecutions, Latinos are
increasingly overrepresented in U.S. prisons.61 The “browning” of
federal prisons62 ironically feeds the erroneous but rampant perception
that immigrants have a higher propensity to commit crimes,63 thus
generating a feedback loop of popular pressure that drives even more
aggressive immigration enforcement.64
Finally, the group setting of the Streamline and Postville style
processes creates an inherently pressured situation where individuals
may well be reluctant to speak up to raise individual concerns. Such an
effort would be an aberration and would seem to run contrary to the
preferences of judges seeking to run expedient proceedings.65
Moreover, even if most pleas are legitimate, serious questions remain as

60. One visitor to the courthouse recalls being told by the bailiff to sit far away from
the mass of defendants because of “the smell.” Interview with Doralina Skidmore,
President, Immigration Law Student Ass’n, Univ. of Ariz., in Tucson, Ariz. (Oct. 3, 2009).
Defendants “can smell pretty ripe.” Sands Interview, supra note 39.
61. Mark Hugo Lopez & Michael T. Light, Pew Hispanic Ctr., A Rising Share:
Hispanics
and
Federal
Crime,
at
i
(2009),
available
at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/104.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting by 2007, Hispanics accounted for forty percent of federal prisoners, which was
triple their representation in general population, and tracing trend to rise in immigration
prosecutions).
62. Ian Haney-López, Post-Racial Racism: Policing Race in the Age of Obama 133
(U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1418212, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418212 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
63. See, e.g., Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant
Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, Migration
Information
Source,
June
2006,
at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=403 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (finding immigrants have lower rates of criminal convictions than
native-born Americans).
64. See Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 3, at 348–49 (discussing ways
in which migrants are perceived as criminals and how those perceptions increase support
for harsh immigration laws); see also Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation, supra note 1,
at 507 (describing disconnect between reality of immigrant propensity toward criminal
behavior and public opinion polls).
65. Williams Testimony, supra note 40, at 4.
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to whether all of these pleas are actually “considered and intelligent.”66
On December 2, 2009, the Ninth Circuit recognized some of these
problems, concluding that the mass plea agreement procedures of
Operation Streamline violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11,
which requires the court to “address the defendant personally in open
67
court . . . and determine that the plea is voluntary.” Reviewing the mass
plea bargaining practice of Operation Streamline, the court concluded
that “[n]o judge, however conscientious could have possessed the ability
68
to hear distinctly and accurately fifty voices at the same time.”
Nevertheless, in the absence of a finding of prejudice, the convictions on
69
appeal were sustained. So while an appellate court has recognized that
Rule 11 violations are taking place on a massive scale, it has concluded
that, absent a showing of individual prejudice, the court will not
intervene to correct the problem.
Even by the low standards of the American plea bargaining system,
the proceedings discussed in this Essay seemingly lack the indicia of
basic fairness that the Constitution and federal procedural rules purport
to provide in criminal prosecutions. Yet these proceedings have
endured a change in administration, and have reshaped the federal
criminal docket. Now, courts are showing little inclination to upset these
practices, despite their acknowledged procedural flaws.
CONCLUSIONS: A CAUSE FOR CONCERN
The retooling of the criminal justice system to manage migration
has resulted in some troubling trends. In this brief Essay, I have
discussed some features of the plea bargaining systems by which
immigration convictions are obtained. Regardless of what one thinks of
current restrictions on legal immigration, the wholesale retooling of the
criminal justice system to manage migration that is evinced in these
examples should raise a host of questions that deserve serious and
immediate attention: Is this an effective deterrent to migrants?70 Is it
worth the monetary price tag? Is it worth the procedural consequences?
66. Id. at 11.
67 United States v. Roblero-Solis, No. 08-10396, 2009 WL 4282022, at *7 (9th Cir.
Dec. 2, 2009) (discussing requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11).
68 Id. at *8.
69 Id. at *9 (requiring showing of prejudice and finding “[n]one of these defendants
has made such a showing or even attempted it”).
70. Although there are reports that crossings are less numerous since the initiation of
efforts like Operation Streamline and the proliferation of workplace raids, see, e.g., Passel
& Cohn, supra note 35, at i, the extent to which this is actually driven by enforcement—as
opposed to the economic downturn, or the rise in migrants who stay in the United States
without authorization once they have entered rather than risking multiple border
crossings—is difficult to ascertain. Id. at ii. Given the fact that Streamline, Fast Track,
and the workplace prosecutions in raids like Postville rely on vastly reduced sentences (in
the case of Streamline, often approximating time served) to induce plea agreements, it is
not exactly clear what deterrent effect is served by incarceration. See also Williams
Testimony, supra note 40, at 17–22 (questioning Operation Streamline’s deterrent effect).
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The ongoing erosion of the procedural rights of these criminal
defendants thus far has been effectively normalized. Such procedural
moves can be framed as nothing more than an extension of longstanding limitations on the due process rights of noncitizens in
immigration proceedings. However, it is important not to lose sight of
the legal distinctions that separate the criminal from the civil realm.
The prosecution of these offenses should not be allowed to reshape the
criminal sphere to look more like the less rights-protective civil system
where immigration enforcement has typically been centered.
Unfortunately, at the moment, this is exactly what is happening.
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